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INTRODUCTION

The venture capital market and firms whose creation and early stages were
financed by venture capital are among the crown jewels of the American
economy. Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth
and job creation, these firms have been a major force in commercializing
cutting-edge science, whether through their impact on existing industries as
with the radical changes in pharmaceuticals catalyzed by venture-backed firms'
commercialization of biotechnology, or by their role in developing entirely new
industries as with the emergence of the Internet and World Wide Web. The
venture capital market thus provides a unique link between finance and

innovation, providing start-up and early stage firms--organizational forms
particularly well-suited to innovation-with capital market access that is
tailored to the special task of financing these high-risk, high-return activities.,
It is hardly surprising, then, that other countries have sought to emulate
American success in developing an effective venture capital market. 2 At a time

when developing countries are increasingly losing manufacturing jobs to low
wage countries, and when low wage countries seek industries that depend on
more than just cheap labor, creating a venture capital market has become the
3
holy grail of economic development.
In this Article, I seek to identify the core of the U.S. venture capital
contracting model, and then assess the extent to which this model provides
1. For example, Kortum and Lerner report that venture capital-backed firms produce
not only more patents, but also more valuable patents than firms without venture capital
backing. Samuel Kortum & Joshua Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capitalto
Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 674-75 (2000).
2. See Laura Bottazzi & Marco Da Rin, Venture Capital in Europe and the Financing
of Innovative Companies, 17 ECON. POL'Y 231, 231 (2002) ("[T]here now exists a wide
consensus among economists, business leaders and policy-makers that a vibrant venture
capital industry is the cornerstone of America's leadership in the commercialization of
technological innovation. A related and widely held belief is that the lack of venture capital
hinders European firms from competing on equal footing.").
3. For European Union commentary, see, for example, Comm'n of the European
Cmtys., Risk Capital: A Key to Job Creation in the European Union (1998) (on file with
author); Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets (2001) (on file with author). At the Nice European Council of December
2000, the European Union's fifteen heads of state characterized entrepreneurship as central
to employment policy. COLIN MAYER, KOEN SCHOORS & YISHAY YAFEH, SOURCES OF
FUNDS AND INVESTMENT

ACTIVITIES

OF VENTURE

CAPITAL

FUNDS:

EVIDENCE

FROM

GERMANY, ISRAEL, JAPAN AND THE UK I (Soc. Sci. Research Network Elec. Paper

Collection,
Working Paper,
papers.cfm?abstract-id=3 14479.

2002),

available

at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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guidance in fashioning a venture capital market in other countries. This effort
proceeds by a number of steps.
The analysis builds on what should be an uncontroversial premise-that
the manner in which the U.S. venture capital market developed is not
duplicable elsewhere.
The U.S. venture capital market has a wildly
idiosyncratic history that finds its origins in post-Gold Rush California, when
Stephen Field, David Dudley Field's more successful younger brother,
facilitated the adoption in California of his brother's failed New York Civil
Code, and thereby planted the seeds for Silicon Valley through the Code's
inexplicable prohibition of covenants not to compete. The locus then moved
east, to the World War II Boston area research labs, and then west again with
Frederick Terman's return to head Stanford's engineering school and his
successful effort to sow the seeds of Silicon Valley by linking Stanford
University and the emerging electronics industry through the creation of the
Stanford Industrial Park, and then east once again with the post-World War II
4
political decisions concerning how to finance retirement security.
But while the path along which the U.S. venture capital market developed
was surely idiosyncratic, the outcome of the development was not. The
argument's most important step is to recognize that the keystone of the U.S.
venture capital market is private ordering-the contracting structure that
developed to manage the extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and
agency costs that inevitably bedevil early-stage, high-technology financing.
Start-up and early stage companies are peculiarly suited to commercializing
innovation, yet the character of their organization and the nature of the activity
present inherent barriers to their finance. The U.S. venture capital contracting
model manages these barriers and thereby makes early stage financing feasible.
The question, then, is whether the U.S. contracting template can be replicated
elsewhere: Can we engineer a venture capital market?
The second step in the analysis takes up the engineering problem. Here the
difficulty is that replicating the U.S. venture capital contracting structure
confronts a daunting simultaneity problem. Three central inputs are necessary
to the engineering process: capital, specialized financial intermediaries, and
entrepreneurs. 5 The problem is that each of these inputs will emerge if the
other two are present, but none will emerge in isolation of the others.

4. Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 588-89,
613-20 (1999).
5. Any capital market also requires a range of foundational attributes, like property
rights, honest and effective courts, and the like. Detailing the general social and institutional
infrastructure necessary to support a capital market of any sort is beyond my ambitions here.
For an interesting assay of these issues with respect to the necessary preconditions for a
stock market, see Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditionsfor Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 781 (2001). See also Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Role
of the State and the Market in EstablishingPropertyRights, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 87 (1996).
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This brings us to the third step: Who will be the engineer? The U.S.
venture capital market developed organically, largely without government
assistance and certainly without government design. Countries now seeking to
develop a venture capital market must necessarily follow a different path than
did the United States, and understandably look to government to provide
direction when market forces are unlikely to solve the simultaneity problem.
As a result, government programs are commonplace in countries seeking to
develop a venture capital market. Most such programs, however, have been
unsuccessful. 6 The reason, I will suggest, is that most government programs
have tried to deal with the simultaneity problem by having the government both
provide capital and act as the financial intermediary. Programs structured in
this fashion fail because the government cannot respond to the trio of
contracting problems inherent in early stage, high technology financing.
Rather, a specialized financial intermediary is a necessary ingredient for which
the government is not a substitute. The point is illustrated by discussion of
three different government programs-one remarkably unsuccessful early
effort in Germany; one more recent, more successful program in Israel; and a
newly launched program in Chile.
The final step in the analysis describes an approach by which the
government can help engineer a venture capital market. The approach
recognizes that the key to the engineering task is solving the simultaneity
problem without substituting the government, which cannot address the
contracting problems of venture capital financing, for critical market
participants.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND
CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURE OF U.S. VENTURE CAPITAL

The typical transactional pattern in the U.S. venture capital market is for
institutional investors-pension funds, banks, insurance companies, and
endowments and foundations-to invest through intermediaries, venture capital
limited partnerships usually called "venture capital funds," in which the
investors are passive limited partners. Venture capital funds are typically blind
pools. At the time an institution decides whether to participate in a venture
capital fund, it receives an offering memorandum that discloses the fund's
investment strategy-for example, that the fund will specialize in a particular
industry, like the Internet, or a distinct development stage, like early stage

6. Despite a large number of European government efforts, the European venture
capital market remains a fraction of the size of the U.S. market. Controlling for the size of
the economy, in 1995, U.S. venture capital financing was eight times the comparable
European figure. PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 326 n. 1
(1999). In 2001, the difference was said to be five times, but that figure may be understated
because of differences in definition of venture capital in the United States and Europe.
Bottazzi & Da Rin, supra note 2, at 232.
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investments. However, the particular companies in which the fund will invest
are not yet known.
Consistent with the legal rules governing limited
partnerships, the limited partners may not participate in the day-to-day
management. of the fund's business, including especially the approval of
particular portfolio company investments. 7 In this respect, the venture capital
fund's governance structure formalizes the standard Berle-Means problem of
the separation of ownership and control. 8 The general partner (GP) puts up
only one percent of the capital, but receives essentially complete control over
all of it. 9 The particular terms of the fund's governance are set out in the
limited partnership agreement. 10
The GP actually makes and monitors the venture capital fund's
investments. The GP is typically itself a company comprised of investment
professionals, which expects to continue in the venture capital market by
raising successive funds after the capital in a particular fund has been invested
in portfolio companies. This expectation, and the GP's investment in a
business infrastructure, provides a powerful performance incentive.
Commonly, the GP will begin seeking investors for a successor fund by the
midpoint of the existing fund's fixed, typically ten-year, term. At the close of
the partnership's fixed term, liquidation is mandatory. Indeed, the partnership
will be in partial liquidation during much of its term because realized profits
from exiting an investment are required to be distributed to the limited partners
on an annual basis.1 1 The GP's principal contribution to the venture capital
fund is expertise, not capital.
This is reflected in the ratio of capital
contributions. In most funds the GP contributes one percent of the fund's
capital, while the limited partner investors contribute the remaining ninety-nine
percent.

7. Under Delaware law, the limited partners can make certain extraordinary decisions,
such as replacing the general partner or terminating the partnership. See DEL. CODE ANN.,
tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(8)(a), (e) (2003). However, these rights are typically restricted by
contract. See Michael J. Halloran, Gregg Vignos & C. Brian Wainwright, Agreement of
Limited Partnership,in 1 VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 1-1 to 1-

218 (Michael J. Halloran, Robert V. Gunderson, Jr., Jorge del Cavo & Benjamin M.
Vandegrift eds., 3d ed. 2002) (form of limited partnership agreement with commentary).

Venture capital funds frequently do appoint advisory committees, usually made up of
investor representatives, that monitor the fund's performance. See William A. Sahlman, The
Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations,27 J. FIN. EcoN. 473, 493
(1990).

8. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
9. Even if one treated the venture capitalist's carried interest as a measure of the value
of its human capital contribution, it is still putting up less than 20% of the capital but
receiving complete control.
10. See Halloran et al., supra note 7, at 1-1 to 1-223. For an examination of the terms
of such agreements, see Paul Gompers

& Josh

Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical

Analysis of Venture PartnershipAgreements, 39 J. LAW & ECON. 463 (1996).
11. Halloran et al., supra note 7, at 1-67 to 1-82; Sahlman, supra note 7, at 491-92.
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The GP's compensation is also skewed. The GP usually receives an annual
management fee for its services, but the fee is relatively small, usually 2.5% of
committed capital. 12 The primary return to the GP is a carried interest-that is,
a right to receive a specified percentage of profits realized by the partnership.
Twenty percent is a common figure. 13 The GP generally is paid its carried
interest at the same time that distributions are made to the limited partners,
subject to two limitations. First, general partners typically receive no
distributions until the limited partners have received an amount equal to their
capital contributions, sometimes with interest. Second, distributions to the GP
are subject to certain "claw back" provisions that ensure that the order of
distribution does not affect the ultimate percentage of profits received by the
GP.
The venture capital fund' equity investments in portfolio companies
typically take the form of convertible preferred stock. 14 While not required by
the formal legal documents, the fund is also expected to make important
noncash contributions to the portfolio company. These contributions consist of
management assistance, corresponding to that provided by management
consultants; intensive monitoring of the portfolio company's performance
which provides an objective view to the entrepreneur; and the use of the fund's
reputation to give the portfolio company credibility with potential customers,
suppliers, and employees.15 While each investment will have a "lead" investor
who plays the primary role in monitoring and advising the portfolio company,
12. Sahlman, supra note 7, at 491.

In most cases, the agreement provides for a

breakpoint above which the management fee is reduced, based either on funds under

management or the number of years after the partnership's formation. Halloran et al., supra
note 7, at 1-108 to 1-116.
13. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 6, at 32; Halloran et al., supra note 7, at 1-51 to 166; Sahlman, supra note 7, at 491.
14. PAUL GOMPERS, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS: AN
EXAMINATION OF CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES IN VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS 2, 314-15

(Harvard Business School, Working Paper, 1997) (on file with author); Sahlman, supra note
7, at 504. Steven Kaplan and Per Stromberg report that convertible preferred stock was used
in 95% of a sample of 200 financing rounds in 118 portfolio companies made by 14 venture
capital firms between 1996 and 1999. STEVEN N. KAPLAN & PER STROMBERG, FINANCIAL
CONTRACTING THEORY MEETS THE REAL WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VENTURE
CAPITAL CONTRACTS 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 7660, 2000),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7660.
Ronald Gilson and David Schizer argue
that this consistency is driven by the tax efficiency of this capital structure in delivering
high-powered incentives to management.
Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer,
Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanationfor Convertible Preferred
Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 (2003).
15. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capitaland the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 252-55 (1998); Thomas F.
Hellman, Venture Capitalists: The Coaches of Silicon Valley, in THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE:
A HABITAT FOR INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 276 (Chong-Moon Lee, William F.
Miller, Marguerite Gong Hancock & Henry S. Rowen eds., 2000); Thomas Hellman &
Manju Puri, Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms: Empirical
Evidence, 57 J. FIN. 169 (2002).

Apr. 2003]

ENGINEERING A VENTURE CAPITAL MARKET

1073

commonly the overall investment is syndicated with other venture capital funds
16
that invest in the portfolio company at the same time and on the same terms.
The initial venture capital investment usually will be insufficient to fund
the portfolio company's entire business plan. Accordingly, investment will be
"staged." A particular investment round will provide only the capital the
business plan projects as necessary to achieve specified milestones set out in
the business plan. 17 While first round investors expect to participate in
subsequent investment rounds, 18 often they are not contractually obligated to
do so even if the business plan's milestones are met; the terms of later rounds
of investment are negotiated at the time the milestones are met and the prior
investment exhausted. Like the provision of noncapital contributions, an
implicit, not explicit, contract typically governs the venture capital fund's right
and obligation to provide additional rounds of financing if the portfolio
company performs as expected. The venture capital fund's implicit right to
participate in subsequent rounds-by contrast to its implicit obligation to
participate-is protected by an explicit right of first refusal. 19
A critical feature of the governance structure created by the venture capital
fund's investment in the portfolio company is the disproportionate allocation of
control to the fund.2 0 In direct contrast to the familiar Berle-Means governance
structure of outside investors having disproportionately less control than equity,
the governance structure of a venture capital-backed early stage, high
investors
venture
capital
company allocates to the
technology
16. Joshua Lerner, The Syndication of Venture CapitalInvestments, 23 FIN. MGMT. 16,

18(1994).
17. See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture
Capital,50 J. FrN. 1461, 1463-67 (1995).

18. Sahlman, supra note 7, at 475, reports that venture capital funds invest one third of
their capital in new investments and two thirds in later round financing of companies already
in their portfolios.
19. Kaplan and Stromberg report that some 15% of the financing rounds in their
sample conditioned disbursement of a portion of the round on explicit contingencies. Many
of these, however, are not inconsistent with the unconstrained option to abandon analysis in
the text. First, in some number of these instances, subsequent financing was contingent on
"no material deviation" from the business plan. Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 14, at 59
tbl.6. While such a formulation does operate to make exercise of the option to abandon
reviewable by a court, it hardly represents state contingent contracting and still leaves the
venture capitalist with a great deal of discretion. Since material changes in a business plan
are predictable given the nature of an early stage business, in most cases the material
deviation contingency will collapse into a pure option to abandon. Second, contingencies
are keyed to readily observable and verifiable events like the issuance of a patent, or the
hiring of a chief executive officer, again instances when a specific uncertainty can be
specified and its resolution observed. Finally, Kaplan and Str6mberg do not suggest that the
venture capitalists are committed to provide future financing rounds even in the minority of
rounds where explicit contingencies are found. Taken as a whole, their data leave intact the
general proposition that venture financing is staged, without binding future commitments by
existing venture investors.
20. See GOMPERS, supra note 14 (explaining the control mechanisms built into
convertible venture financing).
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disproportionately greater control than equity. It is common for venture capital
investors to have the right to name a majority of a portfolio company's
directors even though their stock represents less than a majority of the portfolio
company's voting power.2 1 Additionally, the portfolio company will have the
benefit of a series of contractual negative covenants that require the venture
capital investors' approval before the portfolio company can make important
business decisions, such as acquisition or disposition of significant amounts of
assets, or a material deviation from the business plan. The extent of these
negative covenants is related to whether the venture capital investors have
control of the board of directors; board control acts as a partial substitute for
22
covenant restrictions.
These formal levers of control are complemented by the informal control
elements that result from the staged financing structure. Because a financing
round will not provide funds sufficient to complete the portfolio company's
business plan, staged financing in effect delegates to the investors, in the form
of the decision whether to provide additional financing, the decision whether to
23
continue the company's project.
Two final characteristics of investments in portfolio companies concern
their terms and their expected performance. While these are not short-term
investments, neither are they expected to be long-term. Because venture capital
limited partnerships have limited, usually ten-year terms, 24 GP's have a strong
incentive to cause the fund's portfolio company investments to become liquid
as quickly as possible. Assuming that the GP has invested most of a fund's
capital by the midpoint of the fund's life, the GP then must seek to raise
additional capital for a new fund in order to remain in the venture capital
business. 25 Because the performance of a GP's prior funds will be an
21. In Gompers's sample of portfolio company investments, venture capital investors
on average controlled the portfolio company's board of directors, but held only 41% of the

equity. Id. at 334, 350-51 tbl.4. The venture capital fund's right to select a specified number
of directors is contained in the portion of the portfolio company's articles of incorporation
that sets out the rights, preferences, and privileges of the convertible preferred stock the
investors receive. This portion of the articles will typically be added by amendment
simultaneously with the closing of the venture capital investment. Lee F. Benton, Robert V.
Gunderson, Jr. & Julie M. Robinson, Hi-Tech Corporation: Restated Certificate of
Incorporation, in I VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION, supra note 7, at
8-1 to 8-55, sets out a standard form of restated articles of incorporation in connection with a
convertible preferred stock venture capital financing.
22. See GOMPERS, supra note 14, at 323. The negative covenants are contained in a
different closing document, the investors' rights agreement. Lee F. Benton, Robert V.
Gunderson, Jr. & Julie M. Robinson, Hi-Tech Corporation: Investors' Rights Agreement, in

I VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION, supra note 7, at 9-1 to 9-40, sets
out a form of investors' rights agreement with illustrative negative covenants.
23. GOMPERS, supra note 14, at 316; Anat Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Robust Financial
Contractingand the Role of Venture Capitalists,49 J. FIN. 371, 371 (1994).
24. Halloran et al., supra note 7, at 1-21 to 1-29.
25. See ALEXANDER LJUNQVIST & MATTHEW RICHARDSON, THE CASH FLOW, RETURN
AND RISK CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE EQUITY I I (Nat'l Bureau

of Econ. Research,
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important determinant of its ability to raise capital for a new fund, early
harvesting of a fund's investments will be beneficial. 26 Venture capital funds
exit successful investments by two general methods: taking the portfolio
company public through an initial public offering of its stock (an "IPO"); or
selling the portfolio company to another firm. The likelihood of exit by an IPO
or a sale has differed over different periods. Between 1984 and 1990, 396
venture capital-backed firms went public, while 628 such firms were sold to
other firms before going public. Between 1991 and 1996, the order reversed,
with 1059 firms going public and 524 being sold. 27 It is also common for the
terms of a venture capital preferred stock investment to give the venture capital
fund the right to require the portfolio company to redeem its stock. However,
redemption does not operate as a viable exit mechanism because portfolio
companies lack the funds to effect the redemption. 28 Such put rights are better
understood as a control device that can force the portfolio company to
accommodate the fund's desire to exit by way of IPO or sale.
The fact that portfolio company investments are of limited duration rather
than long term is critical to the operation of the venture capital market. 29 The
noncash contributions made by the venture capital fund to the portfolio
company-management assistance, monitoring, and service as a reputational
intermediary-share a significant economy of scope with its provision of
capital. The portfolio company must evaluate the quality of the fund's
proffered management assistance and monitoring, just as potential employees,
suppliers, and customers must evaluate the fund's representations concerning
the portfolio company's quality.
Combining financial and nonfinancial
contributions enhances the credibility of the information the venture capital
fund proposes to provide the portfolio company and third parties. Put simply,
the venture capital fund bonds the accuracy of its information with its
investment.
The importance of the portfolio company investment's limited duration
reflects the fact that the venture capital fund's noncash contributions have
special value to early stage companies. As the portfolio company gains its own

Working Paper No. 9454, 2003) (showing that, on average, a fund invests 56.8% of
committed funds over the first three years, and 90% over the first six years).
26. Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 255-57; see STEVEN KAPLAN AND ANTOINETTE
SCHOAR, PRIVATE EQUITY RETURNS: PERSISTANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS (working paper,
2003) (demonstrating that capital flows into private equity funds are strongly, positively, and
significantly related to past performance) (on file with author). This need to display results
may cause a GP without a performance record with prior funds to harvest investments earlier
than would be optimal for the investors in order to establish a record sufficient to allow the
raising of a new fund. See GOMPERS, supra note 14.
27. Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 248 tbl.l; Paul Gompers, Grandstandingin the
Venture CapitalIndustry, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 133 (1996).
28. Black & Gilson, supra note 15; GOMPERS, supra note 14. Kaplan & Str6mberg,
supra note 14, at 18, report redemption rights in 84% of the financing rounds in their sample.
29. This discussion draws on Black & Gilson, supra note 15.
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experience and develops its own reputation, the value of the venture capital
fund's provision of those elements declines. By the time a portfolio company
succeeds and the venture capital fund's exit from the investment is possible, the
fund's noncash contributions can be more profitably invested in a new round of
early stage companies. But because of the economies of scope between cash
and noncash contributions, recycling the venture capital fund's noncash
contributions also requires recycling its cash contributions. Exit from a fund's
investments in successful portfolio companies thus serves to recycle its cash
and, therefore, its associated noncash contributions from successful companies
to early stage companies.
The risk associated with portfolio company investments is reflected in the
variability of returns. While some investments return many multiples of the
original investment, a survey of the performance of venture capital-backed
companies, not limited to early stage technology companies and therefore
presenting less uncertainty than the category of investments that concern us
here, reports wide variation in returns. In the sample studied, fifty percent of
the total return was provided by only 6.8% of the investments. Over a third of
30
the investments resulted in partial or total loss.

II.

THE ECONOMICS OF VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTING:
THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION
ASYMMETRY, AND AGENCY COSTS

All financial contracts respond to three central problems: uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and opportunism in the form of agency costs. The
special character of venture capital contracting is shaped by the fact that
investing in early stage, high technology companies presents these problems in
an extreme form. 3 1 Precisely because the portfolio company is at an early
stage, uncertainty concerning future performance is magnified. Virtually all of
the important decisions bearing on the company's success remain to be made,
and most of the significant uncertainties concerning the outcome of the
30. VENTURE ECONOMICS, EXITING VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS (1988) (on file

with author). This high variance is confirmed by a more recent econometric study. See
JOHN H. COCHRANE, THE RISK AND RETURN OF VENTURE CAPITAL 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8066, 2001) ("Venture capital investments are like options;
they have a small chance of a huge pay off.").
31. George Triantis makes the apt point that bank financing of mature firms has
functional parallels to venture capital contracting. For example, lines of credit that can be
cancelled by the lender is a form of staged financing. George G. Triantis, Financial
Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 306 (2001).
However, the combination of the portfolio company's negative cash flow, as well as the
more extreme forms of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency, leads to the use of
equity-like instruments and a level of control quite different from banking practice. This is
consistent with the fact that "venture" funding in Europe by banks is characterized by late
stage investments in low technology industries-circumstances in which these contracting
problems are more muted. See MAYER ET AL., supranote 3, at 4.
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company's efforts remain unresolved. Additional uncertainty concerns the
quality of the company's management, which takes on heightened importance
because so large a portion of the portfolio company's value depends on
management's future decisions. Finally, the technology base of the portfolio
company's business exacerbates the general uncertainty by adding scientific
uncertainty.
The same factors expand the information asymmetries between potential
investors and entrepreneurs, as intentions and abilities are far less observable
than actions already taken. Similarly, the fact that the portfolio company's
technology involves cutting-edge science assures that there will be a substantial
information asymmetry in favor of the entrepreneur even if the venture capital
fund employs individuals with advanced scientific training.
Finally, the importance of future managerial decisions in an early stage
company whose value depends almost entirely on future growth options,
creates potentially large agency costs, 32 which are in turn amplified by the
significant variance associated with an early stage, high technology company's
expected returns. Because the entrepreneur's stake in a portfolio company with
venture capital financing can be fairly characterized as an option, the
entrepreneur's interests will sharply diverge from those of the venture capital
investors, especially with respect to the risk level and duration of the
33
investment.
The organizational and contractual structure of the U.S. venture capital
market responds to this trio of problems. The effectiveness of the response
serves to make the venture capital market feasible. Absent a workable
response, the extremity of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency
problems likely would raise the cost of external capital to a point of market
failure, leading to a similar collapse in the formation of early stage, high
technology companies.
Because of the link between firm size and
innovation, 34 institutional and contractual techniques thus have an important
influence on the successful commercialization of cutting-edge science.
Research and development by large companies with access to the public capital
markets simply is not a substitute for the activities of early stage companies,
financed through the private equity market and dependent on contractual
solutions to the problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency
35
costs.

32. GOMPERS, supra note 14, at 317.
33. For a discussion on the characterization of a corporate stock as an option, see
Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and CorporateLiabilities, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637 (1973); Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of CorporateBorrowing, 5 J. FIN.

ECON. 147 (1977).

The application of option pricing analysis to transactional and

contractual structuring is developed in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW
AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUISITIONs 231-57 (2d ed. 1995).

34. See Kortum & Lerner, supra note 1.
35. See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289
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The organizational and contractual techniques observed in the venture
capital market reflect three basic characteristics. First, very high power
incentives for all participants-investors, GPs, and entrepreneurs-are coupled
with very intense monitoring.36 Second, the organizational and contractual
structure reflects the use of both explicit and implicit contracts. Thus, the
governance structure of both the portfolio company and the venture capital
fund is composed of market as well as formal aspects. Third, a pivotal aspect
of this mix of formal and market govemance, especially repeat play and
reputation mechanisms, is that the two contracting nodes which comprise the
venture capital market-the venture capital fund limited partnership agreement
determined
and the portfolio
company investment contract-are
simultaneously. As we will see, this braiding of the two relationships facilitates
the resolution of problems internal to each.
This Part shows how multiple forms of incentive and monitoring
techniques, including contractual, control, and market mechanisms, operate in
connection with each contracting node to resolve the problems of uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and agency associated with early stage, high
technology financing. We consider first the venture capital fund-portfolio
company contract and then turn to the investor-venture capital fund limited
partnership agreement. Finally, we consider the importance of the braiding of
these two contracts.
A.

The Venture CapitalFund-PortfolioCompany Contract

Five organizational and contractual techniques discussed in Part I-staged
financing, allocation of elements of control, form of compensation, the role of
exit, and reliance on implicit contracts-respond to the problems posed by
financial contracting in the face of extreme forms of uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency costs.

1.

Stagedfinancing.

By giving the investor a valuable option to abandon, the staged financing
structure discussed in Part I responds directly to the uncertainty associated with
contracting for early stage, high technology investments. The milestones in the
business plan are keyed to events that, when they occur, reveal important
information and thereby reduce the uncertainty associated with the project's
ultimate success. Thus, a first milestone may be the creation of an operating
(1999) (discussing the advantages of start-up form).
36. This is consistent with Milgrom & Roberts's "monitoring intensity principle,"
which predicts that, because intense incentives give rise not only to incentives to perform,
but also to incentives to cheat, intense incentives require a significant investment in
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION &
monitoring.
MANAGEMENT 206-47 (1992).
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prototype, which eliminates uncertainty about the portfolio company's ability
to reduce its science to a commercial product. The decision about additional
investment is then made only after the passage of time and performance has
replaced projection with fact. The result is to reduce the uncertainty associated
37
with the funding of further rounds of investment.
Without more, however, staged financing does not increase the expected
value of the portfolio company's project. To be sure, the investor receives an
option to abandon, but the value of that option to the recipient is exactly
balanced by the cost of the option to its writer, the entrepreneur. Absent an
unrealistic assumption about investor risk aversion, merely shifting exogenous
uncertainty from the investor to the entrepreneur does not create value. 38 For
this to occur, staged financing must accomplish something more.
The first respect in which staged financing creates, rather than merely
transfers, value is its reduction of the agency problems associated with the
entrepreneur's management of the portfolio company's operation. Staged
financing aligns the interests of the venture capital fund and the entrepreneur by
creating a substantial performance incentive. If the portfolio company does not
meet the milestone whose completion was funded in the initial round of
financing, the venture capital fund has the power to shut the project down by
declining to fund the project's next round. 39 Even if the venture capital fund
chooses to continue the portfolio company's project by providing another round
of financing, a performance penalty still can be imposed by assigning the
portfolio company a lower value in the new round. To be sure, the portfolio
company may seek financing from other sources if the existing investors
decline to go forward, or are willing to go forward only at an unfavorable price,
but the overall contractual structure significantly reduces the availability of a
market alternative.
First, potential investors know they are being solicited only because
investors in the prior round are dissatisfied with the portfolio company's
performance. Second, the investors' rights agreement gives the venture capital
fund a right of first refusal with respect to future financing that serves as a
substantial deterrent to potential alternative investors. Such an investor will be
37. Brealey & Myers provide an accessible discussion of how to value the option to
abandon. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE,
622-25 (6th ed. 2000).
38. Indeed, the more realistic assumption is that the entrepreneur is risk averse with
respect to the success of the portfolio company since, unlike the venture capital fund, she
will not hold a diversified portfolio of financial or human capital.
39. The venture capital fund's noncapital contributions are also effectively staged. If
the portfolio company has not performed satisfactorily, the GP can decline to make or
receive telephone calls from the portfolio company or its suppliers, customers, or prospective
employees. See Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 254. Gompers, supra note 17, at 1462,
likens this incentive to that provided by the role of debt in a leveraged buyout. The need for
additional funds provides a portfolio company the same "hard" constraint provided by the
need to pay back debt in a leveraged buyout.
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reluctant to make the outlay to acquire the information necessary for deciding
whether to make an investment knowing that that investment will be
significantly reduced if the terms negotiated turn out to be attractive, since the
existing investors will have the right to take part or all of the transaction for
themselves. The result is a serious winner's curse problem. The potential
investor can anticipate that if the price negotiated is attractive, the existing
investors will opt to make the investment themselves. Thus, the potential
investor knows that it will be allowed to make the investment only if the
existing investors, who have better information about the project, believe that
the investment is unattractive.
Staged financing also reduces agency costs by shifting the decision
whether to continue the project from the entrepreneur to the venture capital
fund. Because of the option-like character of the entrepreneur's interest in the
portfolio company, she will go forward with the project under conditions that
favor her and disfavor the venture capital fund. Shifting this decision to the
venture capital fund reduces this source of agency cost.
The incentive created by staged financing in turn operates to reduce
uncertainty in a manner that creates value, rather than merely shifting it from
the investor to the entrepreneur. While staged financing only shifts risk with
respect to exogenous uncertainty-that is, uncertainty which is outside the
parties' capacity to influence-it actually can serve to reduce a different kind of
uncertainty. Some uncertainty associated with the success of the portfolio
company's project is endogenous: It can be influenced by the entrepreneur's
actions. Put differently, the likelihood of the portfolio company's success is in
part a function of the effort expended. By increasing the incentives to expend
effort, staged financing reduces this element of uncertainty.
That brings us to the effect of staged financing on the information
asymmetry between the venture capital fund and the entrepreneur. Staged
financing serves to bridge the information gap in two important ways. First,
every incentive has an information-related flip side that responds to adverse
selection problems. In deciding which portfolio companies to finance, the
venture capital fund has to distinguish between good and bad entrepreneurs
under circumstances in which an entrepreneur has better information about her
own skills than does the investor. Because the incentive created by staged
financing is more valuable to a good entrepreneur than a bad one, an
entrepreneur's willingness to accept an intense incentive is a signal of the
entrepreneur's difficult-to-observe skills. The signal is particularly important
for early stage and high technology portfolio companies because the absence of
a performance history and the technical nature of the projects makes the
entrepreneur's skills particularly difficult to observe. 40

40. Conceptually, the signal will result in a separating equilibrium, in which only high
quality entrepreneurs will accept the incentive, when the low quality entrepreneurs'
alternatives are more valuable to a low quality entrepreneur than the incentive contract. See
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Staged financing reduces information asymmetry in a second way by its
impact on the credibility of the projections contained in the entrepreneur's
business plan. These projections are critical to valuing the portfolio company
and therefore pricing the venture capital fund's investment.
Yet, the
entrepreneur obviously has better information concerning the accuracy of the
business plan's projections of timing, costs, and likelihood of success. Without
more, the entrepreneur has an obvious incentive to overstate the project's
prospects.
By accepting a contractual structure that imposes significant
penalties if the entrepreneur fails to meets specified milestones based on the
business plan's projections-the venture capital fund's option to abandon then
becomes exercisable-the entrepreneur makes those projections credible.
At this point, it is helpful to note a more general contracting problem
associated with the allocation of discretion between parties to an agreement.
Discretion creates the potential for the party possessing it to impose agency
costs. Staged financing, like other organizational and contractual techniques
we will consider, responds to agency problems that result from entrepreneur
discretion by shifting that discretion to the venture capital fund. However, this
technique has a built-in limitation, which we might call the principle of the
conservation of discretion.
Without more, shifting discretion from the
entrepreneur to the fund does not eliminate the potential for agency costs; it
merely shifts the chance to act opportunistically to the fund. For example,
staged financing coupled with a right of first refusal made potent by high
information costs allows the venture capital fund to behave opportunistically in
negotiating the price of a second round of financing. The fund is in a position
to exploit its monopsony power by reducing the value assigned to the portfolio
company even though it has met its projections. 4 1 In such settings, the goal is
to shift discretion to that party whose misuse of it can be most easily
constrained. 4 2 As will appear, misuse of the discretion shifted to the venture
capital fund is policed by market forces in the venture capital market, whose
functioning is crucial to the feasibility of the entire organizational and
contractual structure.
2.

Control.

The venture capital fund-portfolio company contract stands the BerleMeans problem on its head. Instead of investors having disproportionately

GOMPERS, supra note 14; Edward Lazear, Salaries and Piece-Rates, 59 J. Bus. 405 (1986).
41. Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 261-63.

42. In their discussion of the efficient allocation of property rights in innovation
between the innovation and the investor, Phillipe Aghion and Jean Tirole do not consider the
problem of dual-sided moral hazard considered in the text. Rather, they argue that
ownership should be allocated to investor or innovator based on size of marginal
contribution. Phillipe Aghion & Jean Tirole, The Management of Innovation, 109 Q.J.
ECON. 1185 (1994).
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more equity than control as in public corporations, the venture capital fund has
disproportionately more control than equity. Like staged financing, this
allocation of control responds to the problems of uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency associated with early stage, high technology
investments.
Extreme uncertainty concerning the course and outcome of the project
stage being financed creates discretion. The presence of uncertainty means that
the financing contract is necessarily incomplete; an explicit stage-contingent
contract that specifies what action should be taken in response to all possible
events cannot be written. Thus, the contractual structure must deal with
uncertainty by means of a governance structure: creating a process that will
determine the response to an unexpected event. The particular allocation of
discretion between the fund and the portfolio company reflects the influence of
concerns over both agency and information asymmetry.

Two types of control are allocated to the venture capital fund as a response
to agency and information asymmetry problems. First, as we have seen, staged
financing allocates an important periodic lever of control to the venture capital
fund. By reserving to itself the decision of whether to fund the portfolio
company's next milestone, the venture capital fund takes control over the
continuation decision. This power, in turn, gives the venture capital fund the
incentive to make the investment in monitoring necessary to evaluate the
portfolio company's overall performance over the initial funding period. In the
absence of the power to act in response to what it discovers, the venture capital
fund would have no reason to expend time and resources in the kind of
monitoring necessary to balance the intense incentives created to align the two
parties' interests.
Second, giving the venture capital fund disproportionate representation or
even control of the portfolio company's board of directors, and the restriction
of the entrepreneur's discretion through the use of negative covenants, gives the
fund interim control-the power to act to reduce agency costs in the period
between financing rounds. In its most extreme form, the venture capital fund's
interim control carries with it the power to replace the entrepreneur as the
portfolio company's chief executive officer. As with the allocation of periodic
control, the allocation of interim control gives the venture capital fund the
incentive to monitor the portfolio company's performance during the course of
reaching a funding milestone, and in response to the unexpected events
generated by pervasive uncertainty. The discretion unavoidably given to the
portfolio company's day-to-day managers by the occurrence of unexpected
events is policed by the disproportionate control and resulting monitoring
activity allocated to the venture capital fund.
The periodic and interim monitoring encouraged by the disproportionate
allocation of control to the venture capital fund also serves to reduce the last of
the contracting problems-information asymmetry between the venture capital
fund and the entrepreneur. The balance of information between the parties is
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not static as the portfolio company moves forward on its business plan.
Ongoing learning by the entrepreneur increases the information disparity and
therefore the entrepreneur's discretion, which in turn increases agency costs.
Ongoing monitoring by the venture capital fund, made possible by the
disproportionate allocation of control, balances that influence.
Finally, as with staged financing, the allocation of control serves to reduce
information asymmetry by providing the entrepreneur the opportunity to signal
her type. Giving the venture capital fund the power to terminate the
entrepreneur in the event of poor performance gives the entrepreneur a
powerful incentive to perform. The flip side of this incentive is a signal. By
demonstrating her willingness to subject herself to this penalty for poor
performance, the entrepreneur credibly provides information to the venture
43
capital fund about her confidence in her own skills.
3.

Compensation.

The structure of the entrepreneur's compensation responds primarily to
agency costs and information asymmetry problems. Perhaps more starkly than
any other organizational or contractual technique, the portfolio company's
compensation structure creates extremely high-powered performance incentives
that serve to align the incentives of the portfolio company management and the
In essence, the overwhelming percentage of
venture capital fund.
management's compensation is dependent on the portfolio company's success.
Low salaries are offset by the potential for a large increase in the value of the
entrepreneur's stock ownership, and by the award of stock options to other
management members. The performance incentive is further heightened by the
practice of requiring the entrepreneur and other members of management to
accept the imposition of a staged vesting requirement on some or all of their
stock or stock options. The vesting requirement gives the portfolio company
the right to purchase a portion of the entrepreneur's or other management's
stock, at a favorable price, if employment terminates prior to a series of
specified dates. It also restricts exercise of options until after the manager has
completed a series of employment anniversaries, following each of which an
additional number of options both are exercisable and no longer subject to
44
forfeiture if employment terminates.

43. See Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital

Contracts, 29 RAND J. EcoN. 57 (1998) (finding that, under the optimal contract,
entrepreneurs commonly relinquish control to venture capitalists by accepting vesting of
their stock and modest severance packages). Kaplan and Str6mberg, supra note 14, at 23,
report that 55% of early stage financings contained entrepreneur vesting requirements.
44. Lee F. Benton, Robert V. Gunderson, Jr. & Julie M. Robinson, Portfolio Company
Investments: Hi-Tech Corporation, in VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING
NEGOTIATION, supra note 7, at 6-16 to 6-17; Sahlman, supra note 7, at 508.
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While aligning the interests of the venture capital fund and entrepreneur in
some circumstances, the intensity of these incentives can also lead to agency
costs in others. In particular, the option-like characteristics of the portfolio
company's compensation structure can lead the entrepreneur to increase the
risk associated with the portfolio company's future returns, because the venture
capital fund will bear a disproportionate share of the increased downside but
share only proportionately in the upside. Thus, the intensity of the performance
incentives created by the compensation structure gives rise to a corresponding
incentive for the venture capital fund to monitor the portfolio company's
performance. This monitoring, together with the signaling properties of the
entrepreneur's willingness to accept such powerful incentives, also serves to
reduce information asymmetries.
4.

Exit.

Another powerful incentive is created for the entrepreneur by the terms of
the disproportionate allocation of control to the venture capital fund. On the
plausible assumption that the transfer of control to the venture capital is costly
to the entrepreneur, 4 5 the control structure created by the venture capital fund's
investment gives the entrepreneur a valuable call option on control. 46 In effect,
the venture capital fund and the entrepreneur enter into a combination explicit
and implicit contract that returns to the entrepreneur the disproportionate
control transferred to the venture capital fund if the portfolio company is
successful. 47 The explicit portion of the contract is reflected in the terms of the
convertible preferred stock that provide the venture capital fund its
disproportionate board representation and in the investors' rights agreement's
negative covenants that require venture capital fund approval of important
operating decisions. Both documents typically provide for the termination of
these levers of control upon the completion of an IPO of a specified size and at
a specified price. The terms of the preferred stock almost universally require
conversion into common stock, with the resulting disappearance of special

45. A private value for control is a standard feature in models that seek to explain the
incentive function of capital structure. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One
Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1988)

(analyzing the optimality of the one share-one vote rule for allocating control); Milton Harris
& Artur Raviv, Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules, 20 J. FIN. ECON.

203 (1988) (arguing that simple majority voting rule and one share-one vote are the optimal
rules for electing controlling management); Bengt R. Holstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of
the Firm, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61, 79-86 (Richard Schmalensee &

Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (discussing various theories of capital structure based on
incentive reasoning, signaling, and control rights).
46. Black & Gilson, supra note 15, develop the concept of an implicit contract giving
the entrepreneur a call option on control in venture capital contracts.
47. Some contracts also provide for automatic conversion when the portfolio company
meets specified profits or, less frequently, sales targets. GOMPERS, supra note 14, at 329.
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board representation, on a public offering.
The negative covenants in
48
investors' rights agreements also typically expire on an IPO.
The implicit portion of the contract operationalizes the definition of
success that makes the entrepreneur's call option on control exercisable. By
triggering automatic conversion on an IPO, determination of the measure of
success is delegated to independent investment bankers who are in the business
of identifying venture capital-backed companies successful enough to be taken
public, 49 and whose own incentives make their ex post determination of
success credible ex ante. As we will see in the next section, this structure also
allocates to the market enforcement of the venture capital fund's implicit
promise to agree to an IPO when one is available to the portfolio company and
the entrepreneur exercises her call option on control by requesting one.
5.

Reliance on implicit contract: The role of the reputationmarket.

Crucial elements of the organizational and contractual techniques that
respond to uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in the venture
capital fund-portfolio company relationship, have at their core the transfer of
discretion from the entrepreneur to the venture capital fund. Staged financing,
by giving the venture capital fund an option to abandon, transfers the
continuation decision from the entrepreneur to the fund. Disproportionate
board control by the venture capital fund, including the power to dismiss the
entrepreneur herself, also transfers to the fund the capacity to interfere in the
portfolio company's day-to-day business. As a result, the effectiveness of these
techniques is subject to the conservation of discretion principle. Reducing the
agency costs of the entrepreneur's discretion by transferring it to the venture
capital fund also transfers to the venture capitalist the potential for agency
costs-i.e., the opportunity to use that discretion opportunistically against the
entrepreneur.
For example, giving the venture capital fund an option to abandon gives
the venture capital fund an incentive to monitor, gives the entrepreneur an
48. The venture capital fund's ownership percentage, and therefore control, is further
diluted both by the number of new shares sold to the public in the IPO, and by the number of
shares sold by the venture capital fund either in the offering or in the period following the
offering. Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 260-61.
49. See Christopher B. Barry, Chris J. Muscarella, John W. Peavy III & Michael R.
Vetsuypens, The Role of Venture Capitalistsin the Creationof Public Companies. Evidence

from the Going-Public Process, 27 J. FrN. ECON. 447 (1990) (noting that intensive
monitoring services provided by venture capitalists lowers underpricing for venture-backed
IPOs); Alon Brav & Paul A. Gompers, Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance
of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed

Companies, 52 J. FIN. 1791 (1997) (identifying quality of underwriter as one factor for
higher returns of venture-backed IPOs as compared to nonventure-backed IPOs); William L.
Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public

Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879 (1991) (arguing that certification by venture capitalists partially
substitutes and complements certification by investment bankers).
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incentive to perform, and reduces agency costs by shifting the continuation
decision to the venture capitalist. But when coupled with the venture capital
fund's right of first refusal, this transfer of discretion also creates agency costs
on the part of the venture capital fund. What prevents the venture capital fund
from opportunistically offering to provide the financing necessary for the
portfolio company's next stage only at an unfairly low price, relying on a right
of first refusal to restrict the entrepreneur's access to other sources of
funding? 50 Similarly, the transfer of disproportionate control to the venture
capital fund creates the potential for opportunism by the fund. To align
incentives, the entrepreneur's returns from the portfolio company's project take
the form of appreciation in the value of her portfolio company stock and stock
options.
However, the venture capital fund's power to terminate the
entrepreneur, coupled with the vesting requirements that both give the portfolio
company a favorably priced option to purchase the entrepreneur's stock and
cancel all unvested options upon her termination, gives the venture capital fund
the discretion to behave opportunistically. What prevents the venture capital
fund from unfairly terminating the entrepreneur so as to secure for itself the
returns that had been promised to the entrepreneur?
The conservation of discretion principle counsels that discretion be vested
in the party whose behavior is more easily policed. In the context of the
venture capital fund-portfolio company relationship, the presence of an
effective reputation market with respect to the GP's characteristics provides the
policing that supports the transfer of discretion to the venture capital fund.
For a reputation market to operate, three attributes must be present. First,
the party whose discretion will be policed by the market must anticipate
repeated future transactions.
Second, participants must have shared
expectations of what constitutes appropriate behavior by the party to whom
discretion has been transferred. Finally, those who will deal with the
advantaged party in the future must be able to observe whether that party's
behavior in past dealings conforms to shared expectations. 5 1 All three of these
attributes appear present in the venture capital market.
It is unlikely that a GP will have future dealings with the same
entrepreneur. 52 However, as we have seen, the GP will anticipate raising
successor venture capital funds, which in turn will require future dealings with
different entrepreneurs in connection with the investing the new funds' capital.
The requirements of shared expectations of proper conduct, and the
50. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
51. D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contractingin the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL
& EMERG. Bus. L. 133 (1998), examines the information characteristics of the reputation
market for venture capitalists.
52. It is not, however, impossible. Both successful and unsuccessful first round
entrepreneurs may found a new start-up company in need of venture capital financing. See
ANNALEE

SAXENIAN,

REGIONAL ADVANTAGE:

VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 38-39 (1994).

CULTURE AND

COMPETITION IN SILICON
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observability of a GP's satisfaction of those expectations, also appear to be met
in the venture capital market. The community of venture capital funds is
relatively concentrated 53 and remarkably localized. For example, the offices of
a significant percentage of U.S. venture capital funds are found along a short
strip of Sand Hill Road in Silicon Valley. 54 Moreover, venture capital funds
typically concentrate their investments in portfolio companies geographically
proximate to the fund's office. 55 This geographical concentration of providers
and users of venture capital facilitates satisfaction of the informational element
of the structure of a reputation model. Saxenian notes that geographical
proximity has fostered in Silicon Valley extremely efficient informal transfers
56
of information concerning the performance of GPs and entrepreneurs.
Credible accounts of opportunistic behavior by particular GPs can be expected
to circulate quickly among members of the entrepreneur community, who must
select a GP with whom to deal, and among members of the GP community,
who must compete among themselves for the opportunity to invest in the most
promising portfolio companies and therefore have an interest in noting and
transmitting to the entrepreneur community instances of misbehavior by a rival.
B.

The Investor-Venture CapitalFund Contract

In this Part, we turn to the investor-venture capital fund contract. How do
the organizational and contractual techniques discussed in Part I-virtually
complete control vested in the GP, highly incentivized compensation,
mandatory distribution of realized investments, and mandatory liquidation after

53. See DAVID J. BEN DANIEL, JESSE E. REES & MICHAEL D'ANGELO, CONCENTRATION
AND CONSERVATISM INTHE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY (Working Paper, 1998) (on file with

author). In 1987, the top five percent of firms acting as venture capital fund GPs controlled
20% of venture capital raised. The figure rose to 37% in 1992, and to 44% in 1997.
54. SAXENIAN, supra note 52, at 39-40. (Over the period 1996-1999, 41% of all U.S.
venture capital investments were made to portfolio companies located in California. Kaplan
& Str6mberg, supra note 14, at 10)
55. Lerner, supra note 16, reports that venture capital providers located within five
miles of a portfolio company are twice as likely to have a board representative as providers
located more than 500 miles from a portfolio company. See OLAV SORENSON & TOBY E.
STUART, SYNDICATION NETWORKS AND THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF VENTURE CAPITAL
INVESTMENTS (Soc. Sci. Research Network Elec. Paper Collection, Working Paper, 1999)
(demonstrating the geographic and industry-localization of venture capital investments),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=22045 1.
56. SAXENIAN, supra note 52.

1088

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1067

a fixed term 57-respond to the problems of financial contracting in the face of
58
extreme forms of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs?
1.

Control.

Organizing the venture capital fund as a limited partnership serves to vest
virtually complete control in the GP. Short of participation in largely
inconsequential advisory committees and the right, typically restricted by the
limited partnership agreement, to replace the GP, the legal rules governing
limited partnerships prevent investors from exercising control over the central
elements of the venture capital fund's business. Most important, the investors
are prohibited from insisting on an approval right of the GP's investment
decisions. Thus, the venture capital fund's formal governance structure
presents an extreme version of the Berle-Means problem of the separation of
ownership and control: The GP receives control grossly disproportionate to
either its one percent capital contribution or its twenty percent carried interest.
The efficiency explanation for the allocation of control to the GP reflects in
the first instance the extreme uncertainty and information asymmetry
associated with investing in early stage, high technology portfolio companies.
By investing through a financial intermediary, investors secure the benefit of
the GP's skill and experience, which help to reduce the level of uncertainty and
information asymmetry that must be addressed in the contract governing a
portfolio company's investment. However, securing the benefit of the GP's
expertise comes at a cost: The GP must be given the discretion necessary to
exercise its skills and experience on the investors' behalf. And consistent with
the principle of the conservation of discretion, the allocation of control to the
GP creates the potential for agency costs that must be addressed by other
elements of the venture capital fund's organizational and contractual structure.

57. A form of staged financing also appears in the investor-venture capital fund
contract. The limited partners retain the right to withdraw from completing their promised
capital commitments, in effect staging the commitment of capital to the venture capital fund.
Sahlman, supra note 7, at 493-94. Because of the penalties associated with an investor
failing to make its contribution following a capital call, the investor's option to abandon is of
little value compared to the fund's option to abandon written by the portfolio company.
58. Empirical evidence of the value of the organizational and contractual structure is
beginning to emerge. Christopher B. Barry & L. Adel Turki, Initial Public Offerings by
Development Stage Companies, 2 J. SMALL & EMERG. Bus. L. 101 (1998), report that
development stage companies that use an IPO as a substitute for venture capital on average
experience poor long-term performance. In contrast, the portfolios of venture capital funds
on average earn favorable returns. Ronald J. Gilson, Understanding the Choice Between
Public and Private Equity Financingof Early Stage Companies: A Comment on Barry and
Turki, 2 J. SMALL & EMERG. Bus. L. 123 (1998), suggests that the different posttransaction
governance structures associated with the two forms of development stage financing could
explain the different levels of performance.
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Compensation.

The GP's compensation structure is the front line response to the potential
for agency costs resulting from allocating to the GP the control necessary to
apply its skill and expertise on behalf of the investors. As discussed in Part 1,
the bulk of the GP's compensation comes in the form of a carried interest
(twenty percent of the venture capital fund's ultimate profits is a common
figure) distributed to the general partner when realized profits are distributed to
the limited partners. Thus, the compensation structure aligns the GP's interests
in the fund's success with those of the investors: The GP earns returns that are
proportional to those earned by the investors. However, other agency problems
appear in the details of the carried interest. For example, suppose that the first
investment realized by the venture capital fund yields a $1 million profit after a
return to the investors of their $1 million investment. The GP's share of the
profit is $200,000. Now suppose that the next investment realized loses
$500,000, leaving cumulative profits from the two investments of $500,000. If
the GP keeps all of its first $200,000 distribution, then it ends up having
received not twenty percent of the venture capital fund's profits from the two
investments, but forty percent ($200,000/$500,000). This would give the GP
an incentive to realize profitable investments before unprofitable investments,
even if that meant realizing the profitable investments prematurely. Various
formulations of what are called "claw back" provisions respond to the potential
agency cost growing out of this element of uncertainty by either delaying the
GP's distribution, or holding back some portion of it, so that the GP's carried
59
interest can be calculated in total after performance is known.
3.

Mandatory distributionsandfixed term.

While aligning the interests of the GP and the investors, the intensity of the
GP's compensation incentive in turn creates a different agency cost. The GP's
carried interest has option-like characteristics, which may cause it to prefer
investments of greater risk than the investors. This is especially true with
respect to the fund's later investments if the early ones have done poorly. In
that circumstance, the GP actually may be best served by making negative net
present value investments if the investments are sufficiently risky. The same
problem arises with respect to operating decisions that concern a portfolio
company that is doing poorly. Then the option-like character of the GP's
carried interest may align its interests more closely with those of the
entrepreneur, whose compensation under the venture capital fund-portfolio
company also has option-like characteristics. In that circumstance, both the GP
and the entrepreneur may prefer a riskier operating strategy than would best
serve investors.

59. See Halloran et al., supra note 7, at 1-8 1.

1090

STANFORD LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 55:1067

The venture capital fund's fixed term, together with the operation of the
reputation market, responds to this agency cost problem. The fund's fixed term
assures that at some point the market will measure the GP's performance,
making readily observable the extent to which the GP's investment decisions
favored increased risk over expected return. A GP's track record, as revealed
by the performance of its previous funds, is the GP's principal tool for
Thus, the limited
persuading investors to invest in successor funds.
partnership's fixed term assures that opportunistic behavior by the GP with
respect to either venture capital fund investment decisions or portfolio company
operating decisions will be punished through the reputation market when it
seeks to raise the successor funds that justify the GP's investment in skill and
experience in the first place. 60 The expectation of such a settling up helps
support the use of intense compensation incentives by constraining optioninduced GP opportunism.
Mandatory distribution of the proceeds from realized investments and the
venture capital fund's fixed term also respond to a different variety of agency
costs resulting from the allocation of control to the GP. Because the GP
receives a fixed fee, typically in the range of 2.0% to 2.5% of committed
capital, the GP would have an incentive to keep capital within the fund for as
long as possible. If given the opportunity, the GP would simply reinvest the
proceeds of realized investments. Moreover, that opportunity would make it
unnecessary for GPs to raise successor funds, the anticipation of which allows
the reputation market to police GP performance. Mandatory distribution of
realized proceeds and a fixed term respond to this potential free cash flow
problem. Both devices require that the GP allow the investors to measure its
performance against alternatives available in the market before it can continue
managing the investors' money. In this respect, mandatory distributions
operate like debt in a post-leveraged buyout company: Profits must first be
returned to investors before the company can seek to reclaim them by
persuading investors to make a new investment. The fixed term operates like a
contractually imposed takeover by forcing the GP to allow the investors to
choose whether the GP should continue to manage their funds. The
organizational and contractual structure assures that a time will come when
61
market price serves as the measure of the GP's performance.

60. See KAPLAN & SCHOAR, supra note 26 (explaining that a VC with a better (worse)
track record is more (less) likely to raise a follow-on fund).
61. The absence of these characteristics helps explain why closed end investment
companies, like American Research and Development Company, the first venture capital
fund formed in 1946 before the limited partnership structure was invented, never caught on.
See Paul A. Gompers, The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital, 23 Bus. & ECON. HIST. 1

(1994).
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Braidingof the Venture CapitalFund-PortfolioCompany and the
Investor-Venture CapitalFund Contracts

A final means by which the organizational and contractual structure of the
venture capital-portfolio company and investor-venture capital fund contracts
responds to the contracting problems posed by extreme uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and agency costs is through the braiding of the two
contracts. By braiding I mean the fact that the structure of the two contracts are
intertwined, each operating to provide an implicit term that supports the other,
and thereby increasing the contractual efficiency of both. This characteristic is
particularly apparent in two areas: the role of exit and the reputation market.

1.

The braidingof exit.

As we have seen, the obligation of exit from each of the two contracts
comprising the venture capital market-the fixed term of the investor-venture
capital fund contract, and the incentive to realize and then distribute the
proceeds of the investment that is the subject of the venture capital fundportfolio company contract-responds to contracting problems presented by
each of the relationships. Here the focus is on how these two functions of exit
complement each other. As we saw in Part 1, by the time a portfolio company
succeeds, the venture capital fund's noncash contributions to a portfolio
company can be more profitably invested in a new round of early stage
companies. But because economies of scope link the provision of cash and
noncash contributions, recycling the noncash contributions requires the venture
capital fund to exit: to recycle its cash contribution from successful portfolio
companies to new early stage companies. 62 Moreover, the venture capital
fund's exit provides the means to give the entrepreneur an important
performance incentive: a call option on control, the exercise of which is
implemented by the venture capital fund's realization of its investment in the
portfolio company by means of an IPO.
In turn, the recycling of investments from successful portfolio companies
to new early stage companies supports the investor-venture capital fund
contract. Realizing portfolio company investments provides a performance
measure that lets investors evaluate the GP's skill and honesty, and reallocate
their funds to the GPs with the most successful performance. And by providing
the GP's primary tool for persuading investors to provide capital for successor
funds, exit supports the core of the incentive structure that aligns the interests
of investors and the GP.
In sum, the braiding of the role of exit in the investor-venture capital fund
contract and the venture capital fund-portfolio company contract increases the
efficiency of both contracts.

62. Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 254-55.
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The braidingof the reputationmarket.

The venture capital fund-portfolio company contract responds to a number
of problems by shifting important elements of control to the venture capital
fund. The venture capital fund's option to abandon resulting from staged
financing, its board representation and even control, and its power to replace
the entrepreneur, combine to reduce uncertainty and agency costs in two ways.
First, it provides the entrepreneur powerful performance incentives, including a
call option to regain control. Second, it provides the venture capital fund with
the means, and therefore the incentive, to monitor. In turn, the entrepreneur's
willingness to transfer control, and to accept so heavily incentivized a contract
structure, reduces the information asymmetry by signaling the entrepreneur's
type. However, each of these transfers of discretion from the entrepreneur to
the venture capital fund carries with it the potential for opportunistic behavior
by the fund. The entrepreneur is at risk in connection with negotiations over
the terms of the next round financing, in connection with the venture capital
fund's exercise of control through board influence and its power to replace the
entrepreneur, and in connection with the fund's ability not to honor the implicit
call option on control it has written. The efficiency of the venture capital fundportfolio company contract therefore requires a credible constraint to prevent
the venture capital fund from misusing its transferred discretion.
The braiding of the venture capital fund-portfolio company contract with
the investor-venture capital fund contract supports a reputation market that
constrains opportunistic behavior by the venture capital fund. Because the fund
is unlikely to engage in repeated deals with any particular entrepreneur, the
reputation market constraint instead grows out of the investor-venture capital
fund contract. Because the GP needs to raise successor funds, it will have to
make investments in new portfolio companies run by other entrepreneurs. If a
GP behaves opportunistically toward entrepreneurs in connection with previous
portfolio company investments, it will lose access to the best new investments.
This, in turn, will make raising successor funds more difficult. The impact of
the GP's behavior toward current portfolio companies on the success of its
future fund raising efforts serves to police the venture capital fund's exercise of
the discretion transferred to it in the venture capital fund-portfolio company
contract. In turn, the investor-venture capital fund contract's support of the
transfer of discretion to the fund by the venture capital fund-portfolio company
contract helps reduce the contracting problems in the portfolio company
contract and therefore results in higher returns to investors. This encourages
investors to reinvest in the GP's successor funds. Again, the interaction
between the two contracts supports the efficiency of each.
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III. THE ENGINEERING PROBLEM

The canvas of the U.S. venture capital contracting structure in Parts I and II
brings me to the engineering problem. The central lesson to be learned from
the U.S. venture capital market is that it is overwhelmingly the product of
private ordering-an extremely effective contracting structure that covers the
entire venture capital cycle, from initial investment in the VC fund, to the VC
fund's investment in a portfolio company, to the exit from the portfolio
investment to allow the VC fund's cash and noncash investment to be
recycled. 63 Can this model be replicated elsewhere? Who will be the
engineer? Can the government act as the engineer in creating a system that is
driven by private ordering?
The discussion must begin with a caveat. I have in mind a relatively
restricted engineering problem. Any form of effective capital market requires a
range of social, legal, and economic institutions, such as honest courts, an
effective auditing profession, and informational and reputational
transparency. 64 Because of the braided aspect of venture capital contracting,
the whole spectrum of foundational institutions is important to the venture
capital market. For present purposes, I will assume away the more difficult
problem of how to engineer the foundational structure of capital markets,
focusing instead on the more limited issue that is plainly of interest to many
nations and multinational entities like the EU and OECD: how to engineer a
venture capital market.
At this level, developing a venture capital market confronts a difficult
coordination problem that I will call simultaneity. A venture capital market
requires the simultaneous availability of three factors, the provision of any one
of which is contingent on the availability of the other two. A venture capital
market requires (1) entrepreneurs, (2) investors with the funds and the taste for
high-risk, high-return investments, and (3) (as the discussion of U.S. venture
capital contracting illustrates) a specialized financial intermediary to serve as
the nexus of a set of sophisticated contracts.
The nature of the simultaneity problem can be illustrated by a more
familiar example: the development of the U.S. credit card industry. For a
market for credit cards to develop, three factors were necessary. The industry
required consumers who would carry credit cards, merchants who would accept
the cards, and a network of card issuers to provide the cards and the back office
services necessary for their use. If any two of the three elements were
available, the third would be forthcoming. For example, if one observes
consumers who want credit cards and a network that will provide the cards and
the system, merchants will want to accept the cards. The same reasoning

63. The term "venture capital cycle" belongs to Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner.
GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 6.
64. See Black, supra note 5, at 781.
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applies with respect to any other permutation. The problem is in making the
first two of the inputs available. The odd organizational form of the primary
players in this market-Visa and MasterCard-seems to me to have been
shaped by the need to respond to this problem. By organizing as (effectively)
nonprofit cooperatives open to any bank, members could both cooperate in
creating the network and competing intensely at the issuer level in order to
attract customers and merchants. 65
The government is the natural engineer to confront the venture capital
simultaneity problem. While the government did not play an instrumental role
in the development of the U.S. venture capital market, the idiosyncratic U.S.
experience does not provide an example for other countries seeking to establish
a venture capital market more quickly than through accretion. No institution
other than the government has the right incentive to invest in the public good
that results from establishing a venture capital market. The problem, however,
is the mismatch of a government acting to create a market in which it has no
long-term role. The response, I will argue, reflects the lesson of the U.S.
experience and the character of the simultaneity problem. The government can
act to induce the development of the necessary specialized financial
intermediaries and also act to provide, in effect, seed capital, to the new market.
That leaves the third factor necessary to solve the venture capital market
simultaneity problem-entrepreneurs. Here the hypothesis is simply that the
presence of a venture capital framework complete with funding will induce
entrepreneurs to reveal themselves.
An understanding of the governmental role in engineering a venture capital
market that I have in mind can be seen from examining governmental efforts in
three different countries: one early German failure that got every element
wrong and whose failure highlights the shape of what is necessary for a
successful government effort; a more recent Israeli effort that got much of the
structure right; and a current Chilean program that was structured with
precisely this analysis in mind. These examples are not intended to be
illustrative of the wide range of government efforts to create a venture capital
market. Rather, the goal is to highlight what is essential for a successful effort.
A.

The German "WFG" Experience

The German WFG program 66 provides a fascinating example of an early
effort to create a national venture capital market that failed miserably. The
65. See generally DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALANSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC:
THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION INBUYING AND BORROWING ch. 13 (1999).

66. The abbreviation stands for "Deutsche Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft," which
translates roughly to "German Venture Financing Foundation." See RALF BECKER &
THOMAS HELLMANN, THE GENESIS OF VENTURE CAPITAL-LESSONS FROM THE GERMAN

EXPERIENCE 2 (Working Paper, 2001).
careful account of this effort.

I have relied heavily on Becker and Hellman's
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nature of the program's failings, and its mirror image of the core of U.S.
venture capital contracting, provide important guidance on the limits of
governmental engineering.
Formed in 1975 at the insistence of the German federal government and
with the express goal of developing a German venture capital market, WFG
began with 10 million DM in funding, ultimately increased to 50 million DM,
that was provided by twenty-nine German banks, including the largest banks
and the leading savings and loan institutions. The banks' involvement was
encouraged not just by governmental pressure, but also by a generous
government guarantee: The government insured up to seventy-five percent of
WFG's losses. As an inducement to entrepreneurs, WFG's return from a
successful portfolio company investment was capped by the requirement that
the entrepreneur be granted a call option to purchase WFG's position at cost
plus a moderate interest rate. Thus, WFG had quite muted incentives to make
successful investments. It was protected on the downside by the government
guarantee, and limited on the upside to a moderate interest rate-a low risk
(because of the guarantee) and a low return (because of the call option)
investment, a strange vehicle indeed for investing in early stage, technology
companies whose essential characteristic is their high risk.
WFG's governance structure reflected the program's government origin-a
stakeholders' dream of a compromise. WFG had a twelve-person board,
comprised of three bank members, three government members representing the
ministries of commerce, finance, and research and development, two
management consultants, two industry representatives, and two scientists. A
mixed board committee selected the projects to be funded, pursuant to quite
general criteria that nonetheless pointed in the right direction. The focus was to
be on the innovative character of the project's technology, the existence of
attractive commercial applications, and the quality of the entrepreneur.
WFG's investments were structured to be passive, perhaps because the
return character of its investment gave it no incentive to be active. Only
minority investments were made, and WFG received no control rights at all,
even over important decisions. Consistent with this passive structure, WFG
personnel provided no technological or management assistance to their
portfolio companies even though the board members appeared to have the
credentials to be useful.
Comparing U.S. venture capital practices with those of WFG reveals
dramatic differences along every important dimension. Indeed, it would have
67
been difficult for WFG to get the structure any more wrong.

67. To some extent this comparison reflects a fair degree of hindsight bias: The U.S.
venture capital contracting structure had not yet crystallized in 1975. However, Becker and
Hellmann report that the deficiencies in the WFG structure were noted at the time. BECKER
& HELLMANN, supra note 66.
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In the United States, the venture capital contracting structure turns the
Berle-Means problem on its head. Instead of assuming less control than their
proportion of equity would dictate, venture capital investors in the United
States take greater control positions than their proportion of equity. Not only
do they obtain veto rights over major decisions, retain the continuation
decision, and often control a majority of the board, but they also retain the right
to terminate the entrepreneur. In contrast, WFG took a minority position in
portfolio companies and obtained no control rights. An example highlights the
difference. A recent study of a sample of Silicon Valley portfolio companies
shows that professional managers replace more than half of founding
entrepreneurs. 68 WFG never replaced an entrepreneur.
Control and equity give U.S. venture capitalists the means and incentives
to monitor highly incentivized managers. A twenty percent carried interest
based on a one percent capital contribution gives them a huge stake in the
upside. The impact of portfolio company failure on a venture capitalists'
ability to raise subsequent funds and, hence, on the value of their human
capital, assures that they also share the downside.
WFG lacked both the incentives to succeed and the means to monitor.
Given the government guarantee and the entrepreneurs' call option, why should
the banks have bothered to monitor? In all events, WFG lacked levers of
control to act even if monitoring led to discovery of a problem. Control and
equity also give U.S. venture investors the incentive to provide noncapital
inputs to portfolio companies. WFG provided nothing but its initial capital
investment.
The same dampening of WFG's incentives plainly influenced project
selection as well. As already stressed, WFG's position was largely insulated
from a portfolio company's performance. Not surprisingly, the same incentive
pattern repeated itself at the level of the individual decision makers within
WFG. No member of the board selection committee was either rewarded or
penalized for WFG performance.
In short, WFG was a government program that created a financial
intermediary that had no incentives, did not monitor, involved the government
through board representation in project selection and, not surprisingly,
produced dismal results. Over its lifetime, WFG experienced an internal rate of
return of negative 25.07%. In every year of its existence, proceeds from the
government guarantee exceeded revenue from investments. In terms of
addressing the simultaneity problem, WFG generated funds for venture
investing, but created a hollow financial intermediary that was incapable of
playing the central role that the U.S. venture capital contracting system
contemplates. Keep in mind that a significant negative return for WFG
necessarily parallels significant failures for the WFG-funded entrepreneurs. A
pattern of failure will not call forth entrepreneurs.
68. Hellmann & Puri, supra note 15, at 182-83.
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The Israeli Yozma Program

In contrast to the early WFG program, a more recent Israeli program came
closer to getting the incentive structure right. 69 Plainly influenced by the
American experience, the Israeli government established Yozma Ltd. in 1993
with the intention of creating the infrastructure for an Israeli venture capital
market. In particular, Yozma created nine venture capital funds, in which it
invested along with private investors. The structure of Yozma's participation
in these funds was quite different than both the German government's and
banks' participation in WFG.
First, Yozma provided no guarantee against loss. Rather, Yozma provided
capital to the funds, matching up to forty percent of the capital invested by
private investors.
Thus, unlike WFG, private investors and the fund's
managers bore their share of the downside risk.
Second, the Yozma structure preserved intense performance incentives on
the upside. Like the German experience, Yozma's return on its investment was
capped: The private investors had a call option on Yozma's investment at cost
plus (1) a nominal interest rate and (2) seven percent of the future profits from
portfolio company investments in which the fund was then invested. This cap,
however, had very different incentive properties than the cap on WFG's return.
Because Yozma's investment was made in a venture capital fund, rather than
directly in the portfolio company as with WFG, and because the call option was
held by the other investors rather than by the entrepreneur as with WFG, the
returns to the financial intermediary were not capped at all. Rather, the cap
served to leverage the returns, and therefore the incentives, of the intermediary
instead of dampening them. WFG's subsidy to the banks and to the
entrepreneur eliminated any incentive for WFG or its constituent banks to
monitor the entrepreneur's conduct. In contrast, Yozma's subsidy to other
investors increased their incentive to assure that the portfolio companies were
carefully monitored.
Finally, Yozma did not make investment decisions. 70 The fund's managers
selected the portfolio companies in which the fund would invest. Thus, while
Yozma's investments were passive like those of WFG, these passive
investments were made through funds whose managers and other investors
were highly incentivized. In this critical respect, the Yozma structure tracked
the U.S. pattern of interposing a highly incentivized intermediary between
passive investors and the portfolio company.
Yozma's performance was consistent with this more highly incentivized
investment structure. Investment decisions were made by those who bore the
69. This discussion draws on ZOHAN GOSHEN, THE ISRAELI VENTURE CAPITAL MARKET

(Working Paper, 2001) (on file with author).
70. Through another program, Yozma made direct investments in portfolio companies,
much as investors in a U.S. venture capital fund sometimes also have the right to invest
directly in portfolio companies in which the fund invests.
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investment's risk and return. The Yozma funds ultimately increased in size to
over $200 million and in 1997 were successfully privatized.
C.

The Chilean CORFUProgram

A Chilean program begun in 2001, "designed to provide an incentive for
the development of venture capital funding in Chile, '7 1 takes the Yozma
concept a step further in the direction of the U.S. venture capital contracting
model. The program contemplates that a government agency, the Corporation
for the Incentive of Production (CORFU), will invest in privately managed
venture capital funds organized roughly in accordance with the U.S. model.
The fund manager's compensation has the same structure as developed in the
United States-a 2.5% fixed annual fee on assets under management and a
carried interest based on fund performance. Perhaps because of the early stage
of the Chilean venture capital market, the program has a number of features
that seem to be substitutes for the operation of a reputation market among
venture capitalists.
First, the CORFU program seeks to insure more direct investor monitoring
of the fund manager's performance rather than relying only on the structure of
the fund manager's incentives and its investment in reputation. Each fund must
have at least five unrelated investors holding at least ten percent of the fund's
equity each, or at least one institutional investor holding at least twenty percent
of the equity. By requiring the presence of large investors, the structure
encourages internal monitoring of the fund manager.
Second, because the fund manager is likely to have a smaller investment in
reputation at this stage of the development of a national venture capital market,
the CORFU program requires a larger capital investment by the fund manager
than the U.S. pattern of a one percent capital contribution by the general
partner. The Chilean program requires the fund manager to invest at least
fifteen percent of the fund manager's total assets in the managed fund. Note
that the requirement is keyed to a percentage of the fund manager's assets, not
of the fund's assets, an effort plainly directed to insure that even new fund
managers-most local venture capitalists would necessarily be new-have a
direct share of the downside.
CORFU investment in qualifying venture capital funds takes the form of
"loans" that leverage the private investors' and the fund manager's equity
stakes in the fund. While denominated as loans, the CORFU contribution is
functionally preferred equity with a cap on return. The loan accrues interest at
three percent with a term equal to the shorter of the life of the fund or fifteen
years. No interest or principal payment is due until the fund makes a
distribution to shareholders, and final payment occurs on liquidation. CORFU
71.

CORP. FOR THE INCENTIVE OF PROD., VENTURE CAPITAL PROGRAM 1

with author).

(2001) (on file
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has a distribution preference, receiving on liquidation first its principal and
interest, following which the private investors receive an amount equal to their
original investment. 72
Then CORFU receives an amount equal to an
annualized return of nine percent on the principal of the loan. The remaining
funds are paid to the private investors and the fund manager.
Like the Yozma program, the Chilean program provides a subsidy to fund
investors, including fund managers, through capping its return on its
investment. Again, unlike the WFG program, the key feature of the CORFU
program is its focus on the incentives of the financial intermediary. CORFU
remains a passive investor in a venture capital fund whose investment structure,
patterned after the U.S. model, is plainly intended to encourage the kind of
active venture capital fund-portfolio company relationship found in the
73
United States.

IV. A TEMPLATE FOR GOVERNMENT ENGINEERING
OF A VENTURE CAPITAL MARKET

These three examples, together with the lessons of the U.S. venture capital
contracting model, provide guidance in constructing a rough template for
government efforts to engineer a venture capital market. The strategy reflects a
central theme: The government should address the simultaneity problem by
providing seed capital and helping to create the necessary financial
intermediaries that together will encourage the supply of entrepreneurs, while
at the same time maintaining the pattern of intense incentives coupled with
intense monitoring that characterizes U.S. venture capital contracting.
Extending both the Yozma insight and the Chilean CORFU program, the
government would issue a request for proposals for venture capital funds with
the goal of selecting a number of funds run by competing professionals. The
structure of these funds, and the structure of the fund-portfolio company
contract, would generally track the U.S. pattern. A requirement of matching
nongovernmental investors, as reflected in the CORFU program, provides
interested monitors of the fund manager in the period prior to the operation of
an effective reputation market.
Under this arrangement, the fund managers would have the incentive to
seek out promising entrepreneurs, the experience to provide nonmonetary

72. CORFU receives 50% of any preliquidation distribution to fund investors. While
the program document does not specify in greater detail other features of the fund's
governance, CORFU has discretion to choose only funds that have satisfactory governance
structures, and any postinvestment changes in governance require CORFU consent.
73. The author is grateful to LatinValley.com, the first fund manager to participate in
the CORFU program, for copies of the program documentation. Prior to the adoption of the
CORFU program, the author and principals in LatinValley.com made a presentation to the
Economics Minister of Chile suggesting a general approach toward encouraging a Chilean

venture capital market similar to that reflected in the CORFU program and in this Article.
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assistance in the development of the portfolio companies and, given the fixed
term of the fund, the obligation to exit the investment when their noncapital
inputs were no longer necessary. In turn, the government's participation as a
passive investor in the fund allows the government to provide funds to the new
market, but without itself participating in the capital allocation process.
This requirement of allocative passivity is central to carving out an
effective governmental role in engineering a venture capital market. The most
important flaw in the WFG model wag the German government's creation of a
financial intermediary with essentially no incentives to succeed. Direct funding
by the government, the most common form of governmental assistance aimed
at creating an entrepreneurial sector, has the potential to make things even
worse through a kind of Gresham's law. Like WFG, the operators of direct
government programs typically will lack the incentives to carefully monitor
portfolio company management and also will be subject to political pressure
over issues like management replacement and job maintenance. Additionally,
those running direct government programs are unlikely to have the experience
and incentives to provide portfolio companies with noncapital inputs (and
efforts by the government, for example, to influence the decisions of potential
suppliers to the portfolio company would run the obvious risk of political, as
opposed to reputational, pressure).
To make matters worse, the flaws that arise from the government acting as
the financial intermediary may well be attractive to entrepreneurs, who often
view the monitoring and intervention of venture capitalists as unwanted
intrusions. The best entrepreneurs may then prefer the government program to
private venture capital funds, and more frequently fail because they will lack
the benefits associated with an experienced financial intermediary and a proper
incentive and monitoring structure. This leaves the less-talented entrepreneurs
to operate in the private sector, where they will fail more frequently, thereby
discouraging development of private sector financial intermediaries and
decreasing the supply of entrepreneurs. In short, a misconceived government
plan can operate perversely to actually discourage the development of a private
venture capital market.
To be sure, even if the government invests in a private venture capital fund
that formally allocates the government a passive role, a realist would fear that
the government still might try to influence the selection of portfolio companies
(and the interaction between the venture capital fund and the portfolio
company) informally through the implicit promise of future government
funding. Such an effort presents the fund manager with a tradeoff. Fund
managers whose initial efforts are successful will have the capacity to attract
private investors for future funds; in other words, the market makes an implicit
promise of future investment conditioned only on performance and without the
risk of opportunistic breach. In contrast, making politically influenced
portfolio decisions reduces the likelihood of the fund's success, thereby
reducing the value of fund manager's carried interest. In turn, the reduced
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success of the fund makes it more difficult for the fund manager to secure
private investors for future funds.
The result, then, of acceding to the government's effort at informal
influence is to substitute the government's implicit promise of future funding
for that of the market. A fund manager would have reason to question the
credibility of the government's implicit promise-implicit promises typically
require the support of reputational sanction for breach that is lacking in the
government setting. 74 Moreover, the reduced access to the market for future
funding as a result of reduced success due to government meddling serves to
render the fund manager's human capital investment specific to its relation with
the government, thereby creating the potential for subsequent opportunistic
conduct by the government. To be sure, a government retains the means to
pressure fund managers if it loses sight of why it is engaged in the effort to
engineer a venture capital market in the first place, but that is true of any
government involvement, and the proposed structure both limits that effort to
the informal, and creates important incentives for the fund manager to resist.
This model of channeling government efforts to assist in creating a market
into passive investment through incentivized intermediaries has an interesting,
if inadvertent, precedent in the United States. Early in the development of the
leveraged buyout movements, state pension funds were among Kohlberg
Kravis Roberts's (KKR) earliest investors. 75 These early passive investments
in KKR had the unintended consequence of providing government support for
the development of a private equity market, through an intensely incentivized
financial intermediary, with precisely the results hoped for here: Successful
performance by early KKR funds attracted much more private investment into
the private equity market, led to the creation of many more funds, and generally
76
fueled the private equity market's restructuring of U.S. industry.
QUALIFICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Any effort at financial engineering should close with qualifications.
However clever the blueprint, there will always be more moving parts than the

74. The U.S. savings and loan (S&L) industry provides a recent local example of the
difficulty of relying on a government's reputation. In an effort to encourage stronger
(relatively) S&Ls to acquire failing S&Ls and thereby reduce the likelihood of a call on
goverment deposit insurance, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board entered into contracts
that allowed the acquiring S&L to use a purely accounting construct-supervisory
goodwill-to meet regulatory capital requirements, either a subsidy or an exemption
depending on the characterization. A few years later, Congress reneged on the contract by
passing legislation that eliminated supervisory capital. See United States v. Winstar Corp.,
518 U.S. 839 (1996). Governmental opportunism is hardly limited to non-first world
countries.
75. GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS:
KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE 79-80 (1998).
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engineers contemplate. In the case of a government effort to engineer a venture
capital market through passive investment in a highly incentivized
intermediary, the major qualification arises from the way I have framed the
simultaneity problem. The supply of entrepreneurs was treated as solely a
function of the availability of funds and specialized intermediaries-if we build
it, the entrepreneurs will come. But what about an entrepreneurial culture as a
precondition of a venture capital market? Why not a three-factor simultaneity
model, instead of only two?
Two recent papers assessing the slow development of a German venture
capital market, even after funds and intermediaries were said to be available,
argue that Germany lacked the appropriate entrepreneurial culture, with those
having the skills necessary to form technology based start-ups lacking the
tolerance for uncertainty critical to leaving the nest of large firm employment.
In this view, the final elements necessary to launch a German early stage
venture capital market was the Internet explosion, and a large number of
Germans having been exposed to the U.S. business culture, especially through
77
business school training.
One
To some extent the cultural criticism can be deflected.
capital-backed
success
of
venture
is
that
the
of
the
criticism
characterization
Internet start-ups changed the culture, thereby providing the final element
necessary to engineering a venture capital market. But this is simply
rephrasing the simultaneity analysis I have offered, albeit with an intermediate
step: Providing capital and incentivized financial intermediaries attracts some
entrepreneurs whose success, in turn, attracts still more entrepreneurs. Stated
more generally, a cultural change occurs between the government's engineering
effort and the appearance of the market.
I readily confess my discomfort with an easy recourse to culture as an
explanation for when a high technology venture capital market (or any other
economic institution) develops. 78 Too many degrees of freedom are left with
respect to the direction of causation and with respect to defining the variables.
Nonetheless, I cannot avoid a nagging doubt that my two-factor simultaneity
model, like the two-factor asset pricing model, may turn out to be analytically
lovely but empirically challenged. 79 Different countries may respond quite
77. BECKER & HELLMANN, supra note 66, at 20-21; Marc-Oliver Fiedler & Thomas
Hellmann, Against All Odds: The Late but Rapid Development of the German Venture
CapitalIndustry, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Fall 2001, at 31, 35-36.

78. See Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 271-72; Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 517 (1999).
79. The respected economic historian Peter Temin makes the case for a culturally
embedded approach to economic history. See Peter Temin, Is It Kosher to Talk About
Culture?, 57 J. ECON. HIST. 267 (1997). However, his account leaves open the devilish
issues of causation. It would hardly be surprising that cultural mores and economic
institutions generally are consistent, thereby leaving the causative issue open. The more
interesting and unusual circumstance is when they differ.
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differently to the same engineering efforts. As with the two-factor asset pricing
model, other factors may explain the empirical results in ways that turn out to
be difficult to explain analytically even though their presence is revealed
empirically. Should that prove true, the consolation will be that the engineering
effort still will have taught us something important by more clearly framing the
phenomenon that then needs explanation, but now with a range of experience in
different countries that will require more disciplined analysis than the cultural
account has provided to date.

